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COURTING FOREIGNERS UNDER SECTION 43(a) OF THE
LANHAM ACT

The principle of reciprocity' is often the essential element in international agreements designed to insure the citizens of signatory nations
equitable treatment as they travel or conduct business abroad. Insofar
as reciprocity may also constitute a mode of political leverage to bolster
a nation's efforts to secure for its citizens prospective extraterritorial
benefits, the principle has been accorded judicial, as well as legislative,
recognition.' Viewed in this perspective, any judicial decision which
derogates from the policy of reciprocity is deserving of scrutiny.
In Noone v. Banner Talent Associates, Inc., 3 a case of first impression,
Judge Charles Metzner of the Southern District of New York held that
a foreign plaintiff, relying upon a claim analogous to misappropriation
of a trade name,4 could sue a foreign defendant in federal court under
1. Reciprocity has been defined as "the relation existing between two states when each
of them gives the subjects of the other certain privileges, on condition that its own subjects
shall enjoy similar privileges at the hands of the latter state." BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY
1435 (4th ed. rev. 1968).
The importance of this principle in the international domain is in no small part attributable to the dependence of world tranquility upon the mutual recognition and respect of
the sovereignty of all nations. The alternative of a nation according protection to the rights
and privileges of its citizens abroad through its direct intervention in the affairs of the
foreign state would inevitably lead to grave political repercussions and world crises.
2. See, e.g., United States v. United Continental Tuna Corp., 425 U.S. 164 (1976),
wherein the Supreme Court held that a Philippine corporate owner of a fishing vessel,
which sank after colliding with a United States' naval destroyer, could not maintain an
action in federal court since the claim was subject to the Public Vessels Act § 5, 46 U.S.C.
§ 785 (1975) which provides:
No suit may be brought under this chapter by a national of any foreign government unless it shall appear to the satisfaction of the court in which suit is brought
that said government, under similar circumstances, allows nationals of the United
States to sue in its courts.
Relying upon such provision, the Court merely noted that the Philippines accorded United
States nationals no such right of action.
3. 398 F. Supp. 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
4. "Trade name" has been defined as follows:
A name used in trade to designate a particular business of certain individuals
considered somewhat as an entity, or the place at which a business is located, or
of a class of goods, but which is not a technical trade-mark either because not
applied or affixed to goods sent into the market or because not capable of exclusive appropriation by anyone as a trade-mark. "Trade-names" may, or may not,
be exclusive. Non-exclusive "trade-names" are names that are publici juris in
their primary sense, but which in a secondary sense have come to be understood
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Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. 5 Although a cursory analysis of the
relevant statute section reveals that such a legal action may be permissible,6 the decision is inconsistent with the American policy of assuring
United States citizens equal treatment with respect to trademark protection and protection against unfair competition in the international
domain. Since affording foreigners access to our federal courts under
such circumstances undermines the principle of reciprocity and the purposes of treaty arrangements, the district court decision is worthy of
consideration as an undesirable precedent in the field of trademark law
and as a precedent whose ill effect may pervade other areas of the law.
I
FACTS OF NOONE
Peter Blair Noone, the plaintiff, and the individual defendants
achieved world-wide fame as members of the English rock and roll group
known as "Herman's Hermits." Holding himself out to the public as
"Herman," Noone performed as the lead singer of the group, which
made numerous million-selling records and frequent television, stage,
and concert appearances. In 1971 Noone left the group to pursue his
individual career, while the defendants remained together performing
under the billing of "The Hermits." Noone and the defendants performed together again in 1973 in an American concert tour under the
title "Herman's Hermits featuring Peter Noone." Late in 1973, the defendants initiated an American tour without Noone, billing themselves
as "Herman's Hermits," and defendant Banner, a nonexclusive booking
agent, booked all their engagements.
as indicating the goods or business of a particular trader. "Trade-names" are
acquired by adoption and user [sic] and belong to one who first used them and
gave them a value.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1666 (4th ed. rev. 1968). In a statement equally applicable to
exclusive trade names, the -Senate Committee on Patents emphasized the importance of
trademarks:
Trade-marks, indeed, are the essence of competition, because they make possible
a choice between competing articles by enabling the buyer to distinguish one from
the other. Trade-marks encourage the maintenance of quality by securing to the
producer the benefit of the good reputation which excellence creates. To protect
trade-marks, therefore, is to protect the public from deceit, to foster fair competition, and to secure to the business community the advantages of reputation and
good will by preventing their diversion from those who have created them to those
who have not.
S. REP. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1946).
5. Trademark Act of July 5, 1946, ch. 540, §§ 1-45, 60 Stat. 427-44, as amended, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1051-127 (1970).
6. See text, part I, accompanying note 39 infra.
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When the defendants ignored an alleged request by Noone to cease
the use of the above name, Noone organized a musical group in England
and performed under the title "Herman's Hermits." After the defendants brought suit in England to enjoin Noone from using that name
for the group, Noone sued the individual defendants and Banner on
analogous grounds in the United States, basing his claims upon Section
43(a) of the Lanham Act and the common law of unfair competition.,
On a motion to dismiss the action on grounds of lack of standing and
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, among other
grounds, Judge Metzner found adequate reason to maintain the action
under Section 43 of the Lanham Act. Asserting that the Section by its
express terms "does not limit its applicability to nationals of the United
States,"8 Judge Metzner reasoned that the foreign plaintiff had standing
to sue under Section 43(a). Furthermore, viewing the situation as analogous to misappropriation of trade names, the Judge held actionable the
plaintiff's allegation that the use of the name "Herman's Hermits" is a
false description in that "Herman" is not a member of the group. While
the conclusions of the Judge maintain some legal support, the propriety
of the result is highly questionable, mandating renewed consideration
of concepts of federal court jurisdiction and principles of reciprocity.
II
ALIENS AND FEDERAL COURT JURISDICTION
A fundamental rule of jurisdiction is that a "sovereign is supreme
within his own territory and it is generally recognized that under the
universal maxim of jurisprudence he has exclusive jurisdiction over everybody and everything within that territory and over every transaction
that is there effected."' While this rule appears absolute in its terms as
it concomitantly minimizes any distinction between personal and subject matter jurisdiction,10 it is by no means an invalid reflection of the
7. 398 F. Supp. at 262.
8. Id.
9. Deddish, JudicialJurisdiction,a Study in International and Comparative Law, 6
COMP. Jum. Rav. 55, 59 (1969). This principle is known as "territorial jurisdiction" and
constitutes the essential foundation of the legal systems of the United States and Great
Britain. One may contrast this legal philosophy with "personal or nationality jurisdiction"
whereby the personal characteristics of the litigants are determinative of the adjudicative
authority of the court. This latter jurisdictional theory underlies the German, French and
Italian legal systems. The parallelism of federal diversity-of-citizenship jurisdiction is
manifest. A final major principle is "transactional jurisdiction" whereby the parties contractually agree a priori to the courts which are authorized to settle any disputes which
may subsequently arise between them. See id. at 67-70.
10. As a general rule, in order for an American court to have jurisdiction to adjudicate

1976]

Courting Foreigners Under the Lanham Act

jurisdictional principles maintained by the states in the United States.,,
For example, this concept of "territorial jurisdiction" for purposes of
personal jurisdiction has developed to the point where it has been
deemed immaterial how transiently an individual is within the limits
of a state; if he is served with process therein, jurisdiction over his
person is complete."2
Given this expansive view of adjudicatory authority, it is not surprising that states frequently entertain suits brought by aliens. 3 As the
Supreme Court of Iowa declared:
Under the common-law theory, laws are territorial in their operation;
and, while a sovereign may legislate with reference to its subjects outside
of its territorial jurisdiction, general legislation is assumed to apply to
all persons residing, all property situated, and all rights arising within
its territorial jurisdiction, regardless of the status of the parties, as being
citizens or aliens. As to the rights arising or recognized within the jurisdiction, a nonresident alien may maintain suits in the courts without any
special statutory authority.
State courts have even asserted the power to adjudicate actions by one
alien against another alien for torts committed beyond the strict terria given case, the court must possess authority to decide the type of case at issue (subject
matter jurisdiction) as well as authority over the litigants involved (personal jurisdiction).
For a brief discussion of jurisdictional principles, see M. GREEN, BAsIC CMVI
PROCEDURE
11-49 (1972).
11. The adjudicatory authority of the state court systems is extensive within the confines of territorial sovereignty. Perhaps the major limitation on this authority is the concept of exclusive federal jurisdiction which only applies upon express provision therefor
in the Constitution, or laws and treaties adopted thereunder. See C.J. Hendry Co. v.
Moore, 318 U.S. 133 (1943). On the other hand, federal courts are courts of limited subject
matter jurisdiction which depend for the most part upon express Constitutional, statutory, or treaty authority to adjudicate particular types of cases. As a general rule, however,
the precepts of personal jurisdiction are equally applicable to state as well as federal
courts. See GREEN, supra note 10, at 11-14.
12. See, e.g., Alley v. Cdspari, 80 Me. 234 (1888); Smith v. Gibson, 83 Ala. 284, 3 So.
321 (1888); Darrah v. Watson, 36 Iowa 116 (1872); Barrell v. Benjamin, 15 Mass. 354
(1819); Grace v. McArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Ark. 1959). For an analysis of this
principle, see Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The "Power"
Myth and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289 (1956).
13. See, e.g., Sliosberg v. New York Life Ins. Co., 244 N.Y. 482, 155 N.E. 749, cert.
denied, 275 U.S. 526 (1927); Romano v. Capital City Brick & Pipe Co., 125 Iowa 591, 101
N.W. 437 (1904). See also Disconto Gesellschaft v. Umbreit, 208 U.S. 570, 578 (1907)
wherein the Supreme Court remarked, "Alien citizens, by the policy and practice of the
courts of this country, are ordinarily permitted to resort to the courts for the redress of
wrongs and the protection of their rights." Note, however, that all these cases involved
actions between aliens and domestic citizens or jurist persons.
14. Romano v. Capital City Brick & Pipe Co., 125 Iowa 591, 101 N.W. 437, 438 (1904).
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torial jurisdiction of the court. However, whether the courts will recognize such suits is entirely within their discretion.' 5
In contrast to this seemingly boundless authority of the state courts
to entertain legal actions,'6 the federal courts are of limited subject
matter jurisdiction and may recognize suits only when authorized by the
Constitution or the laws and treaties adopted thereunder.'7 In fact, the
general presumption when a suit is initiated in the federal courts is that
the court lacks jurisdiction unless such jurisdiction is affirmatively established by the plaintiff.'8 Consequently, an alien may not sue another
alien in the federal courts unless the prospective plaintiff is able to
embrace a particular Constitutional or statutory provision which authorizes him to do so.'" This qualification on the alien's right to sue, or
for that matter on any individual's right to sue, necessitates a review of
the principle modes of securing federal court jurisdiction.
A.

DIvERSITY OF CITIZENSHIP

One principle ground of jurisdiction in the federal courts is diversity
of citizenship, which, although founded upon a personal characteristic
of the litigants, is nonetheless a type of subject matter jurisdiction."0 The
15. See, e.g., Gardner v. Thomas, 14 Johns. (N.Y. S. Ct. 1817) 134.
16. See note 11 supra.
17. See Hodgson v. Bowerbank, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 303 (1809); Grace v. American Cent.
Ins. Co., 109 U.S. 278 (1883).
18. In a statement equally applicable to district courts, the Supreme Court declared,
"As the jurisdiction of the circuit court is limited, in the sense that it has no other
jurisdiction than that conferred by the Constitution and laws of the United States, the
presumption is that a cause is without jurisdiction unless the contrary affirmatively appears." Grace v. American Cent. Ins. Co., 109 U.S. 278, 283 (1883).
19. The position of the alien seeking to sue another alien is accorded considerable
support by 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970) which provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same
right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be
parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings
for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall
be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of
every kind, and to no other.
While the statute was originally formulated to provide black citizens with the same rights
and privileges as were already enjoyed by white citizens, the statute was held to apply
equally to aliens. See Roberto v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 177 F.2d. 811 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 339 U.S. 920 (1950). See also Takahashi v. Fish and Game Commission, 334 U.S.
410 (1947). However, this statutory provision in no way fulfills the alien plaintiff's need
to otherwise establish the jurisdiction, both personal and subject matter, of the federal
court to decide his case.
20. This mode of jurisdiction is analogous to "personal or nationality" jurisdiction of
some foreign states. See note 6 supra.

19761

Courting Foreigners Under the Lanham Act

essential prerequisites for maintaining an action in the federal courts
under this legal theory are that the "matter in controversy exceeds the
sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between-(1) citizens of different States; (2) citizens of a State, and foreign states or citizens or subjects thereof; and (3) citizens of different
States and in which foreign states or citizens or subjects thereof are
additional parties."'2 A literal reading of this statutory provision dictates that aliens may not sue other aliens under the authority of this
22
section and, in fact, the courts of the country have so uniformly held.
Therefore, it is clear that the Noone cause of action, if any were to be
recognized, could not be maintained under this mode of court jurisdiction.
B.

FEDERAL QUESTION AND "SPECIAL STATUTES"

Contrary to diversity-of-citizenship jurisdiction, however, federal
question and "special statute" jurisdiction are not dependent upon personal characteristics of the litigants, such as domicile or nationality.
The general federal question statute provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000,
exclusive of interest and costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws,
or treaties of the United States.23

In addition, each "special statute" vests the district courts with original
jurisdiction over a particular subject matter, frequently without concern
for the monetary amount in controversy. 24 Although federal "special
21. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970).
22. Jackson v. Twentyman, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 136 (1829); Montalet v. Murray, 8. U.S. (4
Cranch) 46 (1807); Mossman v. Higginson, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 12 (1800); Dassigienis v.
Cosmos Carriers & Trading Corp., 321 F. Supp. 1253 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d. 1016
(2d Cir. 1971); Cunard S.S. Co. v. Smith, 255 F. 846 (2d Cir. 1918).
23. 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1970).
24. Examples of "special statute" sections are 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1970) (providing for
jurisdiction over admiralty and maritime cases), 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (1970) (providing for
jurisdiction over bankruptcy matters) and 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1970), of particular concern to the Note, which provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action arising
under any Act of Congress relating to patents, plant variety protection, copyrights
and trade-marks. Such jurisdiction shall be exclusive of the courts of the states
in patent, plant variety protection and copyright cases.
Furthermore, district court jurisdiction over controversies is often provided for in the
Congressional enactment creating the substantive rights themselves. For example, 15
U.S.C. § 1121 (1970), Section 39 of the Lanham Act, states:
The district and territorial courts of the United States shall have original juris-
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statute" jurisdiction is usually exclusive, such is not the case with respect to trademark law, the body of law encompassing the Noone controversy.
Since neither the general federal question statute nor the special statute provisions qualify those individuals who are capable of bringing suit
thereunder, the federal courts may recognize actions by aliens against
other aliens under these Congressional enactments.n However, the mere
assertion of federal court jurisdiction by the plaintiff is not determinative of whether the court will entertain the action. As federal courts are
of limited jurisdiction, they may examine on their own motion their
authority to assume, hear, and decide any particular case. 21 Although
no clear and universally accepted criteria for determining the existence
of federal question jurisdiction have been formulated, 7 frequently cited
in judicial analyses is the opinion of Justice Cardozo in Gully v. First
National Bank which stated in part:
If we follow the ascent far enough, countless claims of right can be
discovered to have their source or their operative limits in the provisions
of a federal statute or in the Constitution itself with its circumambient
restrictions upon legislative power. To set bounds to the pursuit, the
courts have formulated the distinction between controversies that are
basic and those that are collateral, between disputes that are necessary
and those that are merely possible. We shall be lost in a maze if we put
that compass by.?
diction, the circuit courts of appeal of the United States and the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia shall have appellate jurisdiction,
of all actions arising under this Act, without regard to the amount in controversy
or to diversity or lack of diversity of the citizenship of the parties.
Because of this legal redundancy, federal court jurisdiction over controversies arising
under the Lanham Act may be invoked by application of either 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1970)
or 15 U.S.C. § 1121 (1970).
25. Canada Malting Co. v. Paterson Steamships, Ltd., 285 U.S. 413 (1931); Kavourgias
v. Nicholaou Co., 148 F.2d 96 (9th Cir. 1945); Doidge v. Cunard S.S. Co., 19 F.2d 500 (1st
Cir. 1927); Chengfan Hsu v. Philippine Air Lines, Inc., 98 F. Supp. 805 (N.D. Cal. 1951).
26. Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109 (1936).
27. For a discussion of the confusion engulfing the issue of federal question jurisdiction,
see C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 17 (1970). Despite the controversy over the applicable
jurisdictional criteria, it should be noted that once a particular standard for jurisdictional
analysis has been chosen by a court, the application of such standard should not differ
depending upon the source of the federal right being asserted. As the court maintained in
International Refugee Org. v. Republic Steamship Corp., 92 F. Supp. 674, 678-79 (D. Md.
1950), rev'd on other grounds, 189 F.2d 858 (4th Cir. 1950), "IThe rule to be applied in
determining whether a civil action is one falling within the provisions of Section 1331 is
the same whether we are dealing with the Constitution itself or with treaties or laws made
pursuant thereto."
28. 299 U.S. 109, 118 (1936).
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Irrespective of the criterion used by the court in its jurisdictional
analysis, even if the court concludes that the action of a given plaintiff
strictly qualifies for maintenance under principles of federal question
jurisdiction or special statute jurisdiction, the federal court may nevertheless refuse to exercise its jurisdiction when the parties are foreigners.
For example, in CanadaMalting Co. v. PatersonSteamships,9 an action
brought under the maritime special statute,10 the Supreme Court declared that "in a suit in admiralty between foreigners it is ordinarily
within the discretion of the District Court to refuse to retain jurisdiction; and that the exercise of its discretion will not be disturbed unless
abused." 3' As the Court stated, "Obviously the proposition that a court
having jurisdiction must exercise it, is not universally true; else the
admiralty court could never decline jurisdiction on the ground that the
litigation is between foreigners."32 Of cardinal importance to the present
analysis, however, is the fact that the cause of action in the Canada
Malting Co. case arose in the United States, as did the cause of action
in the Noone case. Cognizant of this fact, the Supreme Court nevertheless declined to assume jurisdiction asserting, "Neither in these, nor in
other cases, has the bare circumstance of where the cause of action arose
been treated as determinative of the power of the court to exercise
discretion whether to take jurisdiction."3
The analytic criteiia to be considered by a federal court in deciding
whether to exercise jurisdiction over a suit between foreigners have
never been explicitly delineated, no doubt because of the infinite variety
of situations under which such a decision need be made. However, the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals has indicated in dicta:
[W]hile an admiralty court of the United States is under no obligation
to entertain jurisdiction where all the parties are foreigners, yet it also
may entertain jurisdiction of a suit between aliens in civil causes of
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction and is inclined to do so when it is
necessary to prevent a failure of justice and if the rights of the parties
would thereby be best promoted. 3'
29. 285 U.S. 413 (1931).
30. 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1970).
31. Canada Malting Co. v. Paterson Steamships, Ltd., 285 U.S. 413, 418 (1931).
32. Id. at 422.
33. Id.
34. Cunard S.S. Co. v. Smith, 255 F. 846, 848-49 (2d Cir. 1918). As a rule, courts are
more prone to refuse to entertain an action between aliens when based on a foreign
nonstatutory tort. See The Paula, 91 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 750
(1937); O'Neill v. Cunard White Star, Ltd., 160 F.2d 446 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332
U.S. 773 (1947). However, for a comment as to the possible impropriety of this legal
practice, see 45 AM. JuR. Int'l Law § 76 (1969).
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Although the "prevention of a failure of justice" criterion should perhaps at times be liberally construed and extended to fields beyond admiralty law to accommodate the interests of foreign litigants seeking a
forum for the resolution of their controversy, such a liberal construction
should not be undertaken in ignorance of underlying principles of reciprocity when the rights of Americans abroad may indirectly be in issue.
For reciprocity purposes, it is also necessary to analyze the scope of
protection being accorded the aliens by affording them the opportunity
to litigate their case in the federal courts in order that this protection
may be compared with that accorded Americans abroad. In this analysis, pendent jurisdiction must be considered.
C.

PENDENT JURISDICTION

By pendent jurisdiction, "it is held that a district court acquires jurisdiction of a case or controversy as an entirety, and may, as an incident
to disposition of a matter properly before it, possess jurisdiction to decide other matters raised by the case of which it could not take cognizance were they independently presented."35 This concept has considerable importance in the fields of copyright, patent and trademark law
due to 28 U.S.C. § 1338(b) which provides: "The district courts shall
have original jurisdiction of any civil action asserting a claim of unfair
competition when joined with a substantial and related claim under the
copyright, patent or trade-mark laws. ' 36 Therefore, if a foreign litigant
were capable of maintaining an action under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act and he had state claims which, along with the federal claim,
derived from a "common nucleus of operative fact,"3 he could assert
both types of claims in the federal forum.3 8 Since pendent jurisdiction
of the federal courts provides foreign litigating parties with these addi35. C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 9 (2d ed. 1970).
36. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(b) (1970). For an insight as to the justification for this statutory
provision, see Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238 (1933).
37. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
38. See Ramirez & Feraud Chili Co. v. Las Palmas Food Co., 146 F. Supp. 594 (S.D.Cal.
1956), afl'd, 245 F.2d 874 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 927 (1958); Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Church, 256 F. Supp. 626 (S.D. Cal. 1966), aff'd, 411 F.2d 350
(9th Cir. 1969), supplemented, 413 F.2d 1126 (9th Cir. 1969); John 0. Butler Co. v.
Standard Oil Co., 365 F. Supp. 501 (N.D. Ill. 1973). See also Note, Development in the
Law-Trade Marks and Unfair Competition, 68 HARV. L. REV. 814, 884-85 (1955).
It should be noted that pendent jurisdiction does not modify the common-law rule that
the mere consent of the parties is insufficient to confer upon a court of the United States
the jurisdiction to hear and decide issues otherwise not within its adjudicatory authority.
See People's Bank v. Calhoun, 102 U.S. 256, 260-61 (1880); accord, Byers v. McAuley, 149
U.S. 608 (1892).
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tional legal benefits, perhaps unavailable to American citizens abroad,
the availability of this mode of jurisdiction to foreigners must be considered in critically evaluating reciprocity arrangements between the
United States and other sovereign states and the desirability of permitting aliens to sue other aliens under the Lanham Act.
II
SECTION 43(a) OF THE LANHAM ACT
In analyzing the propriety of the Noone decision, considerable attention should be given to the breadth of substantive rights created under
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act as well as the jurisdictional issues
discussed above. Section 43(a) provides:
Any person who shall affix, apply, or annex, or use in connection with
any goods or services, or any container or containers for goods, a false
designation of origin, or any false description or representation, including words or other symbols tending falsely to describe or represent the
same, and shall cause such goods or services to enter into commerce, and
any person who shall with knowledge of the falsity of such designation
of origin or description or representation cause or procure the same to
be transported or used in commerce or deliver the same to any carrier to
be transported or used, shall be liable to a civil action by any person
doing business in the locality falsely indicated as that of origin or the
region in which said locality is situated, or by any person who believes
that he is or is likely to be damaged by the use of any such false description or representation."
Although Section 43(a) is specifically phrased to provide relief4" for a
plaintiff against one who uses in interstate commerce either a false
designation of regional origin or a false description or representation in
connection with any goods or services, courts, apparently anxious to
promote a federal law of unfair competition,4' have construed the terms
39. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1970).
40. While Section 43(a) does not mention any particular mode of relief, it is clear that
damages or injunctive relief is available under the statutory provision. Friend v. H.A.
Friend & Co., 416 F.2d 526 (9th Cir. 1969). Furthermore, there is a lesser degree of proof
required where only injunctive relief is sought. In this latter case, the plaintiff need not
prove that purchasers actually are deceived, but only that false advertisements, for example, have a tendency to deceive. Parkway Baking Co. v. Freihofer Baking Co., 255 F.2d
641 (3d Cir. 1958).
41. Judge Clark, in a dissenting opinion, as long ago as 1953, endorsed the most comprehensive interpretation of Section 43(a) when he remarked, "We have already given effect
to the announced purpose of Congress to establish a national law in the Lanham Act so
far as concerns the issue of infringement, 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1). I think we should do the
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of the Section broadly, if not too broadly."
A.

BROADENING THE SCOPE OF SECTION

43(a)

Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act expanded the scope of its legislative
predecessor, Section 3 of the Trade-Mark Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 534, by
providing for a civil action against false description and representation
as well as against false designation of regional origin. A further modification incorporated into the Lanham Act was the elimination of the requirement of proof of "willfulness" or "intent to deceive" as a necessary
element of a cause of action. 3 Yet, despite these limited statutory alterations, commentators have perceived Section 43(a)," and subsequently
judges have construed Section 43(a), as incorporating changes of greater
magnitude. In the landmark case of L'Aiglon Apparel v. Lana Lobell,
Inc., 5 Judge Hastie of the Third Circuit construed Section 43(a) as more
than a mere codification of pre-Lanham common law.
He asserted:
It seems to us that Congress has defined a statutory civil wrong of false

representation of goods in commerce and has given a broad class of
suitors injured or likely to be injured by such wrong the right to relief in
the federal courts. This statutory tort is defined in language which differentiates in it some particulars from similar wrongs which have developed

and have become defined in the judge-made law of unfair competition. . . . But however similar to or different from preexisting law, here
is a provision of a federal statute which, with clarity and precision adesame on the issue of unfair competition, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) [Section 43(a)]." Hyde Park
Clothes, Inc. v. Hyde Park Fashions, Inc., 204 F.2d 223, 227 (2d Cir. 1953). The plausibility of this development was recognized by Professor Derenberg who in 1954 stated, "[A]
federal law of unfair competition may yet be developed based on the private cause of
action created by Section 43 of the Act of 1946 against false advertising, misrepresentation
and similar methods of unfair trading." Derenberg, The Seventh Year of Administration
of the Lanham Trade-MarkAct of 1946, 102 U.S.P.Q. (No. 7, Part II, 1954).
42. For discussions of the development and scope of Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act
and its relationship to prior law, see 1 CALLMAN, UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS, AND
MONOPOUES, § 18.2(b) (3d ed. 1967); Bunn, The National Law of Unfair Competition, 62
HAxv. L. REV. 987, 998 (1949); Germain, Unfair Trade Practices under Section 43(a) of
the Lanham Act: You've Come a Long Way, Baby-Too Far, Maybe?, 49 IND. L.J. 84
(1973); Note, The Lanham Trademark Act, Section 43(a)-A Hidden National Law of
Unfair Competition, 14 WASHBURN L.J. 330 (1975).
43. Compare Section 3 of the Trade-Mark Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 534, which reads in part,
" any person who shall willfully and with intent to deceive, affix, apply, or annex,
" with the text accompanying note 39 supra.
44. See Callman, False Advertising as a Competitive Tort, 48 CoLuM. L. REv. 876
(1948).
45. 214 F.2d 649 (3d Cir. 1954).
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quate for judicial administration, creates and defines rights and duties
and provides for their vindication in the federal courts.46
Shortly thereafter, a district court remarked that "Section 43(a) does
create a federal statutory tort, sui generis. 4
In 1963, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals provided the broadest
interpretation of Section 43(a) that had yet been expressed by a federal
court. In Federal-Mogul-BowerBearings,Inc. v. Azoff,45 the court stated

that Section 43(a) provided a right of action against the "deceptive and
misleading use of words, names, symbols, or devices, or any combination thereof, which have been adopted by a manufacturer or merchant
to identify his goods and distinguish them from those manufactured by

others."49 This statutory interpretation was later affirmed by a district
court of the Second Circuit which remarked, "In determining whether

defendant's actions have violated Section 43(a), it is necessary to point
out that the phrase 'false designation of origin' is not limited to geographic origin."5 It was this expansion of the phrase "designation of
origin" to include the designation of manufacturer which made possible
the application of Section 43(a) to cases similar to misappropriation of
trade names, 51 the nature of the action in the Noone case.
Even though it is clear that a plaintiff need not possess a federally
registered trademark to establish a cause of action under Section 43(a),5 "
it is equally evident that the "broad language" of Section 43(a) does not
46. Id. at 651.
47. Gold Seal Co. v. Weeks, 129 F. Supp. 928, 940 (D.D.C. 1955), aff'd, 230 F.2d 832
(D.C. Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 829 (1956). As a matter of general law, it is held
that "trade-mark infringement and unfair competition are torts and the extent of this tort
liability is governed by the law of the place where the alleged wrong was committed."
Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 358 F. Supp. 1065, 1077 (D. Nev. 1973).
See also 4 CALLMAN, UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS, AND MONOPOLIES, § 100.2(a)(2) (3d
ed. 1967).
48. 313 F.2d 405 (6th Cir. 1963).
49. Id. at 409.
50. Geisel v. Poynter Products, Inc., 283 F. Supp. 261, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). See also
N.S. Meyer, Inc. v. Ira Green, Inc., 326 F. Supp. 338 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). The interpretation
of the statutory phrase "designation of origin" as encompassing something more than just
geographical origin presents an interesting problem in linguistic parallelism which has
never been satisfactorily explained. See Germain, supra note 42.
51. See National Lampoon, Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 376 F. Supp. 733
(S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd, 497 F.2d 1343 (2d Cir. 1974); Rich v. RCA Corp., 390 F. Supp. 530
(S.D.N.Y. 1975).
52. Mortellito v. Nina of California, Inc., 335 F. Supp. 1288 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); N.S.
Meyer, Inc. v. Ira Green, Inc., 326 F. Supp. 338 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Ames Pub. Co. v.
Walker-Davis Publications, Inc., 372 F. Supp. 1 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Matador Motor Inns,
Inc. v. Matador Motel, Inc., 376 F. Supp. 385 (D.N.J. 1974).

Cornell International Law Journal

[Vol. 10:156

cover all aspects of unfair competition. 3 Nevertheless, the recent court
decisions construing the Section have considerably expanded the scope
of substantive rights offered by the statutory provision, and courts
should be hesitant about making such extensive rights available to
aliens suing other aliens without deliberate consideration of issues of
statutory intent and reciprocity.
B.

Is

AN ALIEN "ANY PERSON"?

Although the Supreme Court has stated that the Lanham Act confers
broad jurisdictional powers on United States courts,54 the holding in the
Noone case that foreign plaintiffs may sue foreign defendants under
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, since "[b]y its express terms . . . the
section does not limit its applicability to nationals,"55 appears to be
based upon rather superficial analysis. While it has been established
that "the general provisions of the Lanham Act may be invoked against
foreign citizens who infringe United States trade-marks in this country, ' 56 and courts have found foreign plaintiffs to have standing to sue
United States nationals under Section 43(a),57 the holding in Noone
should not be viewed as the inevitable and legally justifiable consequence of the concurrent application of these two legal principles.
More properly, it should be ascertained whether foreign plaintiffs
seeking to sue other foreign nationals under Section 43(a) come within
a group "arguably within the zone of interests to be protected""8 by the
Act. Consequently, the heavy reliance of the district court in the Noone
case upon the all-encompassing nature of the phrase "any person" as
dispositive of the motion is not justified. 5 While the phrase "any per53. "[Tlhe courts have been careful to recognize that Section 43(a) does not have
boundless application as a remedy for unfair trade practices but is limited to false advertising as that term is generally understood." Alfred Dunbill Ltd. v. Interstate Cigar Co.,
499 F.2d 232, 237 (2d Cir. 1974); accord,Fur Information and Fashion Council, Inc. v. E.F.
Timme & Son, Inc., 501 F.2d 1048 (2d. Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1022 (1974). For a
contrary opinion, which maintains little support, see 14 WASHBURN L.J. 300, supra note
42, at 333.
54. Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952).
55. 398 F. Supp. at 262.
56. Menendez v. Faber, Coe & Gregg, Inc., 345 F. Supp. 527, 558-59 (S.D.N.Y. 1972),
modified on othergrounds, 485 F.2d 1355 (2d Cir. 1973).
57. Scotch Whiskey Ass'n v. Barton Distilling Co., 338 F. Supp. 595 (N.D. Il. 1971),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 489 F.2d 809 (7th Cir. 1973).
58. Association of Data Processing Serv. Org., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970).
59. 398 F. Supp. at 262. Section 43(a) creates two classes of persons who may bring
actions: (1) "any person" doing business in the locality falsely indicated as that of origin
or in the region in which said locality is situated, and (2) "any person" who believes that
he is or is likely to be damaged by use of a false description or representation. In the Noone
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son" appears to be so unambiguous as to admit no other construction
than that provided by the Noone court, an interpretation devoid of an
interest analysis is ill-founded. It is clear that courts recognize at least
some limitation upon the domain of the phrase. For example, in
Colligan v. Activities Club of New York, Ltd.,6" the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals construed "any person," with respect to those able to
bring actions under Section 43(a), as excluding consumers when viewed
in the context of legislative history.' Similarly, application of the "zone
of interests to be protected" standard indicates that the flat jurisdictional rule adopted by the district court in Noone loses its justification
under several circumstances when the principle of reciprocity is incorporated into the analysis.
C.

SECTION 43(a) AND RECIPROCITY

One conceivable situation which generates considerable reservation as
to the desirability of the new jurisdictional rule is the case where the
plaintiff is a person whose country of origin is not a party to any convention or treaty relating to trademarks, trade or commercial names, or the
repression of unfair competition, to which the United States is also a
party, and does not extend reciprocal rights to nationals of the United
States by law. Consequently, such plaintiff could not otherwise receive
certain benefits of the Lanham Act due to his inability to satisfy the
requirements of Section 44(b) concerning treaties and reciprocal rights.2
case, the court is apparently relying upon the latter category of plaintiffs as encompassing
the particular foreign plaintiff.
60. 442 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971).
61. Id.; accord, Alfred Dunhill Ltd. v. Interstate Cigar Co., 499 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1974);
LeBlanc v. Spector, 378 F. Supp. 301 (D. Conn. 1973); Florida ex rel. Broward County v.
Eli Lilly & Co., 329 F. Supp. 364 (S.D. Fla. 1971). The commentators agree that members
of the general public, as consumers, have no right of action under the Lanham Act. See 1
CALLMAN, UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS, AND MONOPOUES, § 18.2(b) (3d ed. 1967);
Derenberg, Federal Unfair Competition Law, 32 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 1029, 1032-39 (1957).
62. In 1946, the Senate Committee on Patents commented:
There has been no serious attempt fully to secure to nationals of countries signatory to the conventions their trade-mark rights in this country and to protect them
against the wrongs for which protection has been guaranteed by the conventions.
Naturally under such circumstances foreign governments do not always give to
citizens of the United States their convention rights. To remedy this discreditable
situation is merely an act of international good faith.
S. REP. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946); reprinted in (1946) U.S. Code Cong. Ser.
1274, 1276. As a consequence, Section 44 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1126 (1970), was
enacted with the intention to carry out American obligations under the International
Conventions. See Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 641 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 871, rehearingdenied, 352 U.S. 913 (1956). With respect to our analysis,
the relevant subsections of Section 44 are (b) and (h) which read as follows:
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A policy of availing United States courts to such plaintiffs may prove
inadvisable in several respects. If the foreign plaintiff comes from a
nation which does not grant Americans similar access to its courts,
American nationals may have fewer rights abroad, depending upon the
nation, than the foreign nationals have in America. Such a situation is
clearly inconsistent with the present trend of the law. That the United
States is adopting an attitude of "equal rights for Americans" is evident
from the district court opinion in John Lecroy & Son v. Langis Foods
Ltd. ,3 which held that the preexisting policy of giving foreign nationals
substantive rights in trademarks which have not been used in the
United States, a policy which was the inevitable result of a literal reading of the Lanham Act, 4 would no longer be condoned. This decision was
predicated upon common-law principles of trademarks which indicate
that rights in a trademark arise from its use and upon the equitable
principle that a foreign trademark applicant should not receive greater
rights in the United States than are available to United States citizens
in the applicant's country.65 In view of this policy of "equal treatment
(b) Any person whose country of origin is a party to any convention or treaty
relating to trademarks, trade or commercial names, or the repression of unfair
competition, to which the United States is also a party, or extends reciprocal
rights to nationals of the United States by law, shall be entitled to the benefits
of this section under the conditions expressed herein to the extent necessary to
give effect to any provision of such convention, treaty or reciprocal law, in addition to the rights to which any owner of a mark is otherwise entitled by this
Chapter.
(h) Any person designated in subsection (b) of this section as entitled to the
benefits and subject to the provisions of this Chapter shall be entitled to effective
protection against unfair competition, and the remedies provided in this Chapter
for infringement of marks shall be available so far as they may be appropriate in
repressing acts of unfair competition.
63. 376 F. Supp. 962 (D.D.C. 1974), rev d sub nom. SCM Corp. v. Langis Foods Ltd.,
539 F.2d 196 (1976). See note 65 infra.
64. See Zelnick, Foreign Trademark Applicants and Registrantsand the Requirement
of Use: The Right to Register, 52 TRADEMARK REP. 641 (1962).
65. Prior to reversal on such grounds, the Lecroy decision had been criticized as incon.
sistent with the intention of the Paris (Multilateral) Convention for the Protection of
Industrial Property, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, T.I.A.S. No. 6923 (hereinafter referred
to in the text and notes as the Convention) and as oblivious and repugnant to the substantive rights created thereunder. See Note, Registration of Trade-Marks in the United
States by Foreign Nationals: Is There a Use Requirement?, 8 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 189
(1975). However, such arguments are not relevant to the hypothetical under consideration
as the individual is deemed not to be a national of a signatory nation. The author is not
affirming the soundness of the lower court opinion in Lecroy but is merely according
emphasis to the premise of assuring Americans equal treatment in the domestic and
international domains.
While the district court opinion in Lecroy reveals the new emphasis on the equal treat-
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for Americans," the fact that sovereign states, such as France, which
predicate their legal systems on the "personal or nationality" theory of
jurisdiction,6 may not accord Americans access to their courts to assert
claims against other foreigners mandates that careful consideration be
accorded concepts of reciprocity in an effort to alleviate this inequity.67
In this sense, the Noone reasoning and decision are highly inadequate.
Furthermore, nations which presently maintain reciprocal agreements with the United States may view with disfavor an American
policy of subjecting their citizens to suits from foreigners whose countries of origin have not entered reciprocal agreements with any nation.
This displeasure may evince itself in a "retaliatory" jurisdictional provision. For example, while Italy generally restricts suits against foreigners
in Italian courts, the nation provides for court jurisdiction if the state
of the foreigner permits similar actions against Italian citizens."
Finally, if the foreigner seeking relief under Section 43(a) is not a
national of a Convention member state, and therefore not subject to the
reciprocity principles of Section 44, he probably can not maintain his
action in federal court due to 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1970) which provides:
"The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action
by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations
or a treaty of the United States." Since by definition we have established that our hypothetical individual is not seeking relief under a
treaty and because actions arising under Section 43(a) are tort actions,69
the party has no standing to sue. 0 As Justice Holmes remarked in reference to the predecessor statute of 28 U.S.C. § 1350, where "the jurisdiction of the case depends upon the establishment of a 'tort only in violament doctrine in the area of trademark law, the doctrine is by no means novel. For
example, in 1912 a district court remarked, "[R]esidents of foreign countries should have
the right of protection for their trade-marks in the United States only where citizens of
the United States could have protection for their trade-marks in the countries in which
they were respectively citizens and residents." De Nobili v. Scanda, 198 F. 341, 345 (1912).

66. See note 9 supra.
67. In fact, one commentator concludes that "French courts may not be authorized or
obliged to decide cases between foreigners." Deddish, supra note 9, at 68.
68. Italian Code of Civil Procedure, art. 77, translated in Deddish, supra note 9, at 69.
69. See note 47 supra.
70. It should be realized that denying the foreign plaintiff access to the federal courts
to sue another foreigner under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act does not completely
undermine the substantive rights of the prospective plaintiff, since as a rule the state
courts would probably be willing to assume jurisdiction over the action, particularly if the
cause of action arose within the given state. Furthermore, it is not inconceivable that the
home forum of the defendant would be agreeable to hearing the case even though the
action arose outside of its strict territorial jurisdiction.
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tion of the law of nations, or of a treaty of the United States,' it is
impossible for the courts to declare an act a tort of that kind when the
Executive, Congress and the treaty-making power all have adopted the
act."7
On the other hand, if the foreigner seeking relief is a national of a
Convention member state, he has adequate recourse under Section 4472
of the Lanham Act to protect his interests which are delineated in the
Convention. In fact, the plaintiffs argument under these circumstances
to permit an action between foreign parties is probably strengthened by
Article 10bis(1) of the Convention which stipulates, "The countries of
the Union are bound to assure to nationals of such countries effective
protection against unfair competition."73 The prospective plaintiff may
therefore assert that proscribing his suit against another foreigner undermines his substantive right of "effective protection" against unfair
competition. Furthermore, when operating within the context of the
Convention, the United States is also in a better position to assure its
citizens equal treatment in the international domain. Such is the nature
of the primary benefit to be derived from the mutuality of multilateral
treaties. Insofar as a judicial decision, such as Noone, upsets this principle of mutuality, the effectiveness of the underlying treaty or reciprocal
arrangement is undermined.
CONCLUSION
Unqualified by reciprocity, a flat jurisdictional rule permitting foreigners to sue other foreigners under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act
is clearly unsound. Such a rule undermines the purpose of Section 44 of
the Lanham Act which, in conjunction with the Convention for the
Protection of Industrial Property, adequately protects the interests and
privileges of the citizens of nations concerned with the equitable treatment of all individuals in the area of trademark law. More importantly,
however, the jurisdictional rule derogates from the policy of reciprocity
which attempts to advance the principle of equal treatment for Americans in the international domain. To the degree that the new rule affords
foreign plaintiffs, otherwise not welcome in our courts, the opportunity
to assert broad substantive rights and grants them access to expansive
legal theories, such as pendent jurisdiction, its ill effect is magnified.
Before the jurisdictional rule is extended to other areas of the law, a
more sober consideration of its repercussions is in order.
Michael M. Matejek
71. O'Reilly de Camara v. Brooke, 209 U.S. 45, 52 (1907).
72. See note 62 supra.
73. Convention, 21 U.S.T. 1583, T.I.A.S. No. 6923 (emphasis added).

